1.0 TITLE: INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT UNDERLYING WMAs AS VEHICLES FOR SUSTATINABLE WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT IN TANZANIA

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4.0 Introduction

4.1 Background

The Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) initiative as the institutional mechanism for devolving management to the community level and creating local incentives for conservation (Nelson, 2007) featured first in The 1998 Wildlife Policy of Tanzania as a new category of protected areas in Tanzania. This came after a worldwide call for Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM). According to Roe and Nelson, (2009) CBNRM is a way of managing resources such as wildlife by collective local institutions for local benefits. In Tanzania WMAs aimed at devolving management responsibilities of wildlife resources to the local people and enabling local people to benefit from wildlife through various business ventures such as consumptive and non consumptive wildlife utilization while guaranteeing sustainable wildlife conservation (MNRT, 1998).

In Tanzania, WMAs are established by The Wildlife Conservation Act No 12 of 1972 and No 5 of 2009 under the Wildlife Management Areas Regulation of 2002. Principally, and according to the Wildlife Policy of Tanzania 1998, the local community should have been the sole governor, proprietor as well as beneficiary of WMAs. However, the government under The Wildlife Division in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT) under the Director of Wildlife is largely in control of WMAs. At the local level a new institution: Community Based Organisation (CBO) also known as Authorised Association whose mandate is given by the Director of Wildlife is responsible to conserve wildlife resources for the benefit of local communities in the village land. Moreover, Tanzanian government constitution recognises the existence of customary laws. However, its applicability in WMAs is uncertain.

Besides the government, there are many interest groups, individuals, national and international organisations in WMAs, making successful common pool resources governance (Ostrom, 1990) complex. Elsewhere, economic incentives and participation in the decision-making previously thought to have been the product of CBNRM have faced many challenges. Including insufficient incentives, lack of power devolution, and in some cases loss of biodiversity (Makaya, 2002). In Tanzania, policies (MNRT, 1998, 2007) advocating WMAs, emphasize devolution at the same time government ownership of wildlife resources. Together with the policies, regulations on WMAs establishment and utilization of resources therein, are determined by the government.
4.2 Problem Statement

The process of establishing WMA as portrayed in the WMA regulation of 2002 is claimed to be highly prescriptive, contribute to delays in WMA formation and requires significant community investments of time and resources (WRI and RDI, 2010). As a result, to date, more than a decade since the 1998 policy, there are a total of 14 WMAs with Authorised Association (AA) status. Due to the cumbersome involved, much of the process of establishing WMAs is aided by donors (Nelson, 2007) who were initially mentioned in the 2002 regulation as assistants in the process of establishing WMAs.

Besides limited success in WMAs in view of the process of WMA establishment, there is a great deal of confusion over exactly what a WMA is (Benjaminsen, et al., ). For instance, in some areas such as Loliondo WMA establishment has faced rejection and other areas of the country contestation over WMA establishment has been obvious (WRI and RDI, 2010). Among the communities concerns lies on WMA benefit sharing mechanisms (WRI and RDI, 2010; TNRF, 2009). In this case, the Wildlife Acts NO 12 of 1972 and No 5 of 2009 and WMA Regulations do not explicitly clarify how revenues are to be shared. Instead the Acts state it “shall comply with guidelines issued by the Government from time to time (URT, 2009). Also, the power of management of WMAs is currently alleged to be largely re-centralised (TNRF, 2009; Benjaminsen, et al.,) rather than devolving the power of the management of the wildlife resources to the local communities (MNRT, 1998). For example, the Director of Wildlife has the power and authority to revoke any investment agreement in the WMA. Also, the WMA must apply to the Director of the Wildlife Division for consumptive user rights and for a hunting block quota. In addition to that, WMA regulations give the Director of the Wildlife Division authority, on how rights are realized and how wildlife is used in WMAs and on the village land.

Moreover, the Wildlife Conservation Act does not provide explicit framework for WMA establishment. This has led to confusion over the status of an AA that lacks clear formal authority over wildlife in the WMA (Nelson, 2007). Actually, the law as well as the WMA regulations contradict other legislations, including the Local Government and District Authorities Act of 1982, the Land Act No 4 of 1999, and the Village Land Act No 5 of 1999.
These legislations grant the Village Government executive powers over village land. Also, the act contradict MKUKUTA objective to harmonize sectoral laws in order to reduce conflicts over land rights. It is claimed that despite wide consultation, the content of the Wildlife Conservation Act No 5 of 2009 is not favourable to increasing local income from wildlife or local participation in wildlife management, neither to promoting good governance of natural resources (TNRF, 2009).

Furthermore, confusions arise on who is responsible for the WMA; the Community Based Organisation (CBO), village governments under the village councils, or the Wildlife Division under the MNRT. This makes the line of accountability to be unclear (Nelson, 2007) to most of the WMAs. The CBO that is formed during WMAs establishment is a new institution that is different from the village government structure. Nevertheless, more than one village usually contribute amount of land that would form a WMA. These lands usually house different types of natural resources. For example, Nelson, (2007) reported that Ipole WMA located in Tabora region in western Tanzania has diverse natural resources including an extensive woodlands and high regenerative potential of Miombo tree species that would be more lucrative than wildlife resources. However, so far there have been no efforts to integrate resource uses in WMAs (Nelson, 2007). Therefore, the potential for WMAs forest resources for climate change mitigation has been highly undermined. According to IRA (2007) ‘WMA is a viable economic and wildlife conservation enterprise outside wildlife protected areas, and it is worth investing on it’. If this is the case, WMAs could also save for climate change mitigation. Thus WMA potential has not been fully realized as far as climate change mitigation is concerned. Nevertheless, it is known that the poorest communities in the poorest countries will be most impacted by climate change (Roe and Nelson, 2009). Therefore, climate change mitigation knowledge in WMAs will be of paramount importance.

4.3 Problem Justification

Looking at the background information and the problem statement, it is clear that the WMA institutional arrangement and interaction between institutions lack clarity. Moreover, the incentive structure that could give local people reasons for conservation is quite vague as well. Not only that, the potential of WMAs for climate change mitigation is unknown. These pose questions on why the management of the forest sector at the local level through Joint Forest Management (JFM) in the same country and same ministry has been relatively
successful than WMAs? Also, why the same structure of management in a close by country Namibia in a form of conservancies has been more successful (Binot et al., 2009) than Tanzanians’ WMAs? This study aims at solving the complexity above. It will assess thoroughly these institutions at the local, national and international levels that frustrate WMAs as effective institutions for wildlife resources management. It will also evaluate on how incentives and disintegration of resources uses in WMAs could affect the future of WMAs. Furthermore, the potential of WMAs for climate change mitigation will be investigated.

This study will be an eye opener to the policy makers, politicians, the donor community, NGOs supporting WMAs establishment and the Ministry of Natural resources and Tourism on the new direction of WMAs and the change that is needed as far as institutions and incentives are concerned. It will inform the academic and researchers on the importance of WMAs for climate change mitigation and what the future holds for WMAs in Tanzania.

4.4 Objectives

4.4.1 General Objectives

The general objective of this study is to analyse institutions at the local, national and international levels, their impact to the incentive structure and sustainability of WMAs and the potential of WMAs for climate change mitigation in Tanzania.

4.4.2 Specific Objective

1. To analyse institutional setup of CBNRM (local, national and international) including policies and their influence to incentive structure of WMAs
2. To evaluate how the incentive structure can be optimised for sustainability of WMAs
3. To assess the exercise of community’s power and accountability over WMAs establishment, management and benefit sharing
4. To assess the influence of politics, politicians and the ruling party’s environmental policy to decision making processes in WMAs
5. To examine the influence of the country’s need for revenues and increased global demand for resources (e.g., minerals and timber) to the sustainability of WMAs
6. To investigate the potential of WMAs for climate change mitigation
4.5 Research Questions

1. How is the institutional setup of WMAs influence its incentive structure and sustainability?

2. How can the incentive structure of WMAs be optimised?

3. How do the communities involved with WMAs exercise of power and accountability over WMAs establishment, management and benefit sharing?

4. How and why politics, politicians and the ruling party’s environmental policy to decision making processes in WMAs

5. How do the country’s need for revenues and increased global demand for resources (e.g., minerals and timber) influence the sustainability of WMAs?

6. What is the actual and potential ability of WMAs for climate change mitigation?

5.0 Methodology

5.1 Study Sites

This study will be conducted within four WMAs with AA status. These are Ipole WMA in Tabora Region in the North West of the country, Mbarang’andu WMA in Songea Region in the South of the country, MBOMIPA WMA in Iringa Region in the South West of the country and Enduiment WMA in Kilimanjaro Region in the Northern part of the country. Ipole and MBOMIPA are known as successful cases in WMAs however, Ipole is one example of WMAs with abundant resources besides wildlife that are not yet integrated into incentive package of WMAs. Enduiment has been faced with myriads of challenges on establishment, power struggles and benefit sharing and Mbarang’andu shows how resources needs such as minerals could make WMAs vulnerable to their sustainability. Nevertheless, all cases have one thing in common; that is institutional confusion. The location of these WMAs will provide enough variations and information needed for this study.

5.2 Research Design and Sampling Procedure
This study will use longitudinal design where data collection will be done over an extended period of time for three years (2012-2014). A combination of household surveys and participatory approaches i.e., Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) for data collection will be used. Initially, a baseline survey to determine local socio-economic, institutional and political condition will be conducted using interviews with groups and key informants, and br using trend/historical lines. The result of the baseline survey will be used to determine the sampling intensity and formulate household questionnaires. Random sampling technique will be used for selecting households for questionnaire survey. Focus groups discussions, key informants and trend lines will be used to analyse institutions at all levels, the interaction between institutions, politics and their influence to decision making and incentive structure of WMAs. A household questionnaire will be used to investigate the exercise of community’s power and accountability over WMAs. A Venn diagrams will be used to identify interest groups and their influence in WMAs. Maps of the village land use plans, seasonal calendar and trend analysis will be used to investigate the WMAs climate change mitigation potential. Also, field observation will be done to compliment data obtained from other methods in this study.

5.3 Sampling Frame, Unit and Sample Size

The sampling frame for each village will be the list of all households in the village. The sampling unit will be the household. The sample size will depend on the population size of each village. For questionnaire survey a sample of between 5% and 15% of the population which is considered statistically satisfactory will be taken.

5.4 Data Analysis

PRA data will be analyzed thematically at the point of collection in participatory way with local communities. Content analysis will be used to analyse data obtained through key informant interviews and focus group discussions. Data from Household Questionnaire Surveys will be coded and fed into Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software for analysis. Descriptive statistical analysis will be used to summarize information and explore the data for the distribution of responses. Whenever necessary Microsoft excel spread sheet will be used to provide means, frequency and drawing various charts.

6.0 References

Wildlife Management in Tanzania: Recentralization, Rent Seeking, and Resistance


